Is Science Accelerating?
Until recently, experts thought it was slowing down. Then you-know-what appeared.

What was American life like a hundred years ago? The economist Robert J. Gordon offers a vivid picture in his book “The Rise and Fall of American Growth,” from 2016. In 1926, Gordon writes, there were almost no paved roads west of the Mississippi. Fewer than one in ten homes had an electric refrigerator. (A typical one cost the equivalent of ten thousand dollars today.) If you lived in Muncie, Indiana, the odds were one in four that your house had no running water, and one in three that it had no sewer connection. Life was rough by our standards. And yet, Gordon shows, scientific and technological progress was obvious everywhere. Thousands of new hospitals were being constructed, many with cutting-edge X-ray departments. Ninety-three per cent of Iowa farmers owned automobiles, even though the automobile itself had begun to appear only three decades before. 1926 was the year it became possible for an ordinary person to travel on an airplane; it was also when an inventor named Clarence Birdseye perfected frozen food, making the consumption of fish affordable in landlocked places. The way people lived was clearly better than how their parents had lived.
This rapid “epochal transformation,” Gordon writes, actually continued for a whole century, stretching from 1870 to 1970. It was powered by five “Great Inventions”—electricity, urban sanitation, chemicals and pharmaceuticals, internal-combustion engines, and signal transmission. The Great Inventions, in turn, were based on foundational discoveries in physics, biology, medicine, chemistry, math, and other fields. “What makes the period 1870–1970 so special is that these inventions cannot be repeated,” Gordon writes. The germ theory of disease, which Louis Pasteur advanced in the eighteen-eighties, led to sweeping changes in pretty much every aspect of life, and yet it could be discovered only once. The principle of electromagnetism unlocks everything from engines to radios, but there aren’t infinite, similarly powerful principles to uncover and apply. The staircase of science—or at least this flight of it—appears to have only so many steps.
What happens after the biggest discoveries have been made, explored, and put to use? Arguably, the rate of progress slows, and dramatic transformation becomes harder to achieve. The practice of science itself also changes. In recent decades, economists and other researchers have explored a field that they call “metascience”—the study of why the pace of scientific discovery increases or decreases. They point out that, although more scientific papers are being published, fewer are truly disruptive; more patents are granted, but a smaller number are for “breakthrough” inventions. Increasingly, science is conducted inside enormous bureaucracies that favor cautious, incremental research. Grants are awarded mainly to sure bets; power concentrates among august institutions and scientists. In a 2020 paper, the economists Nicholas Bloom, Charles I. Jones, John Van Reenen, and Michael Webb asked, “Are ideas getting harder to find?” They observed that the number of researchers required to double the speed of computer chips was eighteen times larger than it had been in the early nineteen-seventies. For a long time, they concluded, progress had emerged from “a constant flow of new ideas.” Now that flow has slowed.
Is this how life feels in 2026? Does it seem to you that scientific and technological progress has plateaued? It’s true that the iPhone Duo is only somewhat exciting. But, on the other hand, there is now a pancreatic-cancer pill and a melanoma vaccine. In Massachusetts, a man named Tim Andrews lived for the better part of a year while relying on a gene-edited kidney grown inside a pig. Norwegian salmon farms now use underwater A.I.-controlled laser robots to kill sea lice; in France, a startup has made tiny drones that can do the same for mosquitoes in your back yard. “Technological evolution is still accelerating,” the computer scientist John von Neumann wrote, in a 1955 essay, toward the end of Gordon’s spectacular century. In that particular essay, von Neumann was thinking mainly of nuclear power, machine automation, and climate control—technologies that have progressed slowly or fizzled out. And yet computer science, a field to which he made foundational contributions, has made steady—and now startling—new advances. The question of whether science is slowing or accelerating is complicated by its essential unpredictability. And because science is an interpersonal, interwoven enterprise, progress in one area can enable it in others, in ways that might not be easy to foresee.
A cartoon equation for science might go like this: B (brainiacs) + M (money) x T (technology) = D (discovery). Needless to say, it isn’t that simple. The brainiacs can be arranged in all sorts of organizations and hierarchies; the money can flow to the right ones or the wrong ones. The technology can be employed correctly or incorrectly; the discoveries can result in smarter brainiacs, more money, and better technology, or they can die on the vine. Fields and methods, meanwhile, can be young or grown-up, flexible or ossified, fashionable or passé. “At the time I was starting, lots and lots of things were just opening up,” Eve Marder, a neuroscientist who began her career in the nineteen-seventies, told me. “I started just after the time when someone could put an electrode anywhere in any nervous system and see something that no one had ever seen before—which is very, very different from the much more mature science that we have today.” For neuroscientists now, she went on, “what constitutes ‘success’ or ‘new knowledge’ has changed, and the incentive structures have also changed.” Marder recalled going to her first neuroscience conference, which had around five hundred attendees, allowing her to meet many of the most important figures in the field. Today, the big annual meeting put on by the Society for Neuroscience typically hosts around twenty thousand researchers.
Marder is now an eminent scientist: her lab, at Brandeis University, studies how individual neurons connect to create stable circuits that can survive and function over time. She has won major awards, supervised large numbers of scientists and graduate students, and participated in research projects of varying sizes. “We have a very complicated challenge in science today, which is that there are some things that can only be done by ‘big science,’ ” she said. “If you’re doing ‘small science,’ with small groups of people, then the ones who make mistakes can be very easily corrected or can self-correct. But, if you do big science poorly, somebody can make a bad decision and take everyone down a bad path.”
In a big-science world, researchers often work in large consortia that cross institutional and disciplinary lines. They collaborate to gather vast quantities of data, hoping that it will be amenable to analysis now and in the future. Young scientists can find themselves assimilated, Borg-style, into these expansive projects and the institutions that make them possible. “A student who goes into a field is captivated by ideas,” Marder said. “They want to discover something, to create something, just like a philosopher wants to think something no one’s ever thought. And then they are socialized by having to get to the next step, or get the next fellowship. They start worrying about who they have to please—and that can flow down and change the science that they’re willing or able to do.” Some young scientists “are very stubborn, and will continue to be independent and innovative, and become leaders in their fields,” Marder went on. But “a lot of very creative people get driven out.”
If the scale of modern science can dwarf individual scientists, it can also sideline their contributions. “Right now, on my desk in my office, I have a huge pile of really important papers by brilliant people that I don’t have time to read—there’s too many of them,” Michael Levin, a biologist at Tufts, told me. “I conclude, by symmetry, that nobody has time to read my papers, either. That raises the question: Who the hell am I writing all this for?” Levin, who studies bioelectric computation—the process through which cells communicate and make collective decisions—believes that science is, in fact, accelerating: one sign is that “it’s becoming more and more difficult to stay apprised of the important things.” In a 2005 paper titled “The Burden of Knowledge and the ‘Death of the Renaissance Man,’ ” the economist Benjamin F. Jones explored this paradox. Since “knowledge accumulates as technology progresses,” he wrote, there is ever more to know, and so the “educational burden” on researchers increases; eventually, it becomes harder not just to know everything but to know what’s needed for you, in particular, to push knowledge forward. Ironically, science may be slower precisely because it’s moving quickly in too many directions.
Organizational and communicative challenges exist alongside what might be called problems of ambition: science can be slow simply because, at this point, its aims are Olympian. Kristin Persson, a materials scientist at the University of California, Berkeley, explained one overarching goal in her field: predicting how different arrangements of atoms will behave under different conditions, so that they can be combined into new and useful materials. “For a very long time, we’ve been trying to do what some people call multi-scale modelling,” she said. “You start out with atoms and electrons, and you have an equation for behavior on that length scale and time scale. Then you take those properties and you feed them into higher-scale equations.” The approach, she said, has “never really taken off, because of what’s lost in translation every time you move from one set of equations to the next.”
It’s hard, in other words, to precisely predict the behavior of matter at every scale. The theoretical basis for such predictions was established a century ago—in 1926, as it happens—by the physicist Erwin Schrödinger, who devised a single equation describing how electrons interact under the laws of quantum mechanics; it’s relatively simple to solve for small numbers of electrons, but becomes unwieldy as atoms add up. If you want to use it at a large scale, you can solve it only approximately, unless you want your computer to calculate for billions of years. Science is full of such bottlenecks: places where dramatic insights, some long-standing, can’t yet yield practical results.
Today’s computers may not be fast enough to effortlessly apply Schrödinger’s Equation—but they are, apparently, fast enough to read and think. Accordingly, Levin told me, scientists are using artificial intelligence to respond to the burden of knowledge. “They take that stack of papers and put it through an A.I., and say, ‘Summarize this for me,’ ” he said. Levin regards it as a useful innovation, wielded by experts, that might itself be accelerated. “If all my work is going to get filtered through an A.I., then why am I putting out a traditional paper, with all of this stuff we do for each other—with the freaking grammar, and the PDFs, and the figures, which the A.I. has to take apart?” he asked. He anticipates a near future in which the form of the scientific paper becomes A.I.-ready, with old knowledge ably surfaced by artificial intelligence alongside new work. “There are amazing authors with amazing sets of papers from twenty, thirty years ago that nobody knows today,” he said. “Theoretically, that information is there somewhere, but, if nobody knows it and nobody uses it, then do we really have it?”
It could be that some version of this transformation is already under way. Scientists are increasingly using large language models not just to read papers but to write them: studies from last year, when A.I. was less capable, found that many researchers had experienced writing-productivity boosts of between thirty-three and fifty per cent, and submissions to journals and to conferences are up, in some cases dramatically. Meanwhile, in a study titled “AI Article Reviews Dominate Human Peer Reviews at Their Best,” two Harvard researchers, Gary King and Steven Worthington, show that peer reviews performed by L.L.M.s “are now better, by every measure we could construct, than reviews written by well-compensated human experts”; they’re even “judged to be of unusually high quality by journal editors and authors.” It’s possible to discern, in these developments, a new rhythm of scientific communication.
L.L.M.s work with language: it’s not surprising that they can be used to process information. But what about the actual labor of science, which is concrete, empirical, and often outrageously time-consuming? “There’s a lot of ‘donkey work,’ ” Persson, the materials scientist at Berkeley, said. Experiments must be done painstakingly, over and over, for years, and even then they can produce unpredictable results; a brilliant young researcher might spend her whole postdoc on the creation of a statistical model that’s immediately bested by someone else’s. Scientific progress is slow, in part, because there aren’t that many passionate, hyper-educated people willing to devote themselves to hands-on, detail-oriented, ruthlessly competitive, and often fruitless labor.
It’s clear, at this point, that A.I. can automate some of the donkey work. “We have a bunch of computational neuroscientists in my lab, and every last one of them says, ‘I can now do in a week what would have taken me six months,’ ” Marder, the neuroscientist at Brandeis, told me. Materials scientists use computer simulations that can easily run off the rails. “When I was a graduate student, I logged in late at night to see if my simulation had worked out,” Persson said; she’d then spend untold hours troubleshooting. Now, she explained, “L.L.M.s are learning from errors in the simulations and applying their corrections autonomously to keep them on track.” This leaves time-constrained researchers free to focus on higher-level questions.
The advantages may go beyond vibe coding. A.I. systems “are so helpful at solving problems because they can try lots of things,” Michael Brenner, a professor of applied math and physics at Harvard who also helps direct A.I. science efforts for Google, told me. At Google, Brenner led the development of a system called Empirical Research Assistance (ERA), which scientists can use to create data-analysis tools. In many ways, ERA also addresses the burden of knowledge: researchers pose questions to it, and provide it with data, and it responds by trying and mixing different extant methods of analysis in numberless combinations, discovering new paths to progress. (Researchers have used ERA to create improved disease-forecasting models, for example.) “It’s like swapping and flipping, flipping and swapping the pieces, and trying to figure out something that actually works,” Brenner said. The power of the system, he went on, was “not Einsteinian but Edisonian”: it consisted in the novel application of known ideas.
Could A.I. offer even more in the way of novelty, contributing to the automated production of new data, new knowledge, and new theories? Both Levin and Persson described automated laboratories as a logical next step. Currently, Persson said, the creation of new experimental data is extraordinarily expensive and time-intensive—but robots, she argued, could be used “to produce data at scale,” which could then be analyzed by existing A.I. models or used to train new ones. (This data, she noted, might also have the advantage of being unusually consistent and free from human error.) “We’re going to get lab automation,” Levin said. “Then there’s going to be no more concern with hallucination or confabulation—the A.I.s are going to try stuff, and it either works or it doesn’t. At that point, once they have the ability to actually test out the consequences of their hypotheses, the loop is going to accelerate, and all this is going to go exponential.” This vision—in which A.I. speeds up not just the collection and analysis of data but the generation of hypotheses and the design of experiments—represents one of the more radical acceleratory possibilities for science. Levin suggested one major obstacle: “A.I. has been obviously trained on human output where conventional theories are overrepresented,” he said. To arrive at “unconventional ideas”—the kinds that lead to full-throttle acceleration, and to world-changing invention—it would have to become less consensus-driven.
If dramatic scientific acceleration occurs, it will be significant on at least three levels. First, there’s the question posed by John von Neumann, the computer scientist, in his 1955 essay: “Can we survive technology?” Today, the concept of a technological “singularity” is easily taken to refer to a single Promethean moment, such as the invention of superintelligent A.I. But the concept, which is often credited to von Neumann, can have a simpler meaning. New technologies are frequently hard to manage; as more of them pop up, their management gets more and more difficult, until they become, in aggregate, unmanageable. How many simultaneous “upgrades” can society withstand? This problem concerned von Neumann precisely because he was writing toward the tail end of the century of invention described in “The Rise and Fall of American Growth.” If we are entering such a period again, we need to be as concerned as he was with the problem of technology management. We need to shift from a fetishization of disruption to a fascination with control.
Second, there’s the question of growth. In his book, Gordon shows how much life can improve when Great Inventions are changing the world. During the hundred years he describes, people got healthier and ate better; worked less and travelled farther; moved into bigger, more comfortable houses; and grew increasingly educated while exercising more personal freedom. The economy expanded because lives were expanding. But today, the United States, along with most of the Western world, is facing a crisis of growth. Populations are aging, and the ratio of workers to pensioners is falling. The costs of housing, food, education, health care, and other necessities are rising, as are our debts. “What are we going to do?” the economist Tyler Cowen asked, recently. “Plan A is that A.I. will help us grow more quickly, and we will manage to pay our bills. . . . There is no Plan B.” We need some new Great Inventions; an acceleration in science, enabled partly by A.I., is our most promising path to getting them.
Finally, there’s the not-unimportant matter of human knowledge. Progress in science is good—but it doesn’t always feel good. Often, it centers not on the arrival of answers but on the proliferation of difficult questions. The same may be true for progress in the practice of science. Sudden advances in mathematics have led some mathematicians to say that their field has been “broken” by artificial intelligence. “I don’t think math is broken,” Brenner told me. “It’s hard for the community, and some of my math colleagues might disagree with me, but I think it’s a very exciting time in mathematics, a time to really rethink things and break new ground.” Persson agreed: “Maybe the mathematicians are having a rough time, but honestly I would congratulate them,” she said. “You should talk to some of my students: They see a lot of their mundane work going away. They can focus on fun things; they can do simulations they could never do before.” It was, she suggested, a great time to become a scientist. ♦
Originally published by newyorker.com. Syndicated material does not necessarily reflect the views of Glamour Canada.




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