Why the Democrats Have Been Making the Same Mistake—for 44 Years

Having lived now through four particularly stinging Democratic presidential election defeats as an adult (1980, 2000, 2016, and 2024), I can tell you two things. One: The baseline criticism in every case has been the same. Two: Democrats, being (mostly) liberals, tend to overthink and overanalyze things. Parties lose elections for a hundred reasons, and yes, it’s worth giving some thought to all of them.

But it’s striking to me that in these crushing defeats that have occurred over the course of 44 years, the basic thrust of the criticism has been the same: The party lost contact with working-class voters. The criticism has assumed somewhat different form over the years—most notably, 1980 is a little different from the other more modern cases, because it was pre-polarization and Democrats were still theoretically competitive in a number of states that are deep red today. But its essence has always been the same—and it is valid and correct.

So that brings us to a question. If we agree that the Democrats have lost repeated elections because they’re not speaking directly enough to working-class voters’ economic concerns, then why do they keep making the same mistake?

Before I explore answers, it’s important to note: They don’t always make this mistake. Bill Clinton showily ran as a centrist on certain high-profile matters, but he also campaigned on the famous Carvillian mantra about the economy, and when he got into office, he passed a stimulus bill that raised taxes on the wealthy and increased the gas tax (this would, alas, be bad politics today, but it showed some gumption back then). Barack Obama won, in my view, not chiefly because of hope and change, but because after the financial meltdown of September 2008, he responded more responsibly than John McCain did and persuaded voters that he was better equipped to handle the crisis. Then he ran a very economic-centric reelection campaign. Finally, in 2020, Joe Biden embraced a respectably populist program and announced his intention to change the country’s economic assumptions.

In contrast, Al Gore in 2000 ran an economically cautious campaign. His convention speech was fairly populist, but between the convention and the election, he tucked that in. Hillary Clinton promoted a few populist ideas such as a stock-transfer tax, but she mostly hewed to her cautious instincts. Besides, her team was convinced there was no way she was going to lose, so there was no need to do anything bold to nail down those last couple million votes.